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Countering Insurgency and the Myth of “The Cause”
Abstract
It is possible for an insurgency to develop from a single cause, for the insurgents to identify
and communicate this unifying cause to the population, and for the insurgents to remain
steadfastly focused even as counterinsurgents undermine their organization and redress
the cause. But often the case that there is no single cause, that popular support is
mobilized by appealing to multiple motivations, and that by the time counterinsurgents
resolve the initial grievance, the insurgency has found alternative justifications to mobilize
popular support. Since insurgent leadership is often competent and adaptive, it would be
wise to consider the latter scenario against any counterinsurgency strategy. Yet, even when
this is acknowledged in the counterinsurgency literature, the theory is remarkably silent
how this affects the choice of operational approach This paper addresses this gap and
offers a framework for more accurately mapping, understanding, anticipating, and
addressing the multiple causes that draw adherents to insurgency and allow for its
perpetuation.
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Introduction
There is much already written on the importance of winning “hearts and
minds” and how this relates to the insurgent cause.1 However, most works on
the causes of insurgency tends to focus on the spark that ignited the
insurgency. That is, the stated list of issues, grievances, or indeed insults, that
engaged the hearts and minds of the population sufficiently to motivate them
to rebel. Crisis events and initial grievances may serve as a catalyst for the
mobilization of an insurgent movement; however, it is often discovered in
retrospect that underlying societal tensions fomented rebellion before and
after the seemingly critical spark event. In fact, successful insurgents
continue to identify and leverage underlying tensions in a society as part of
their cause to further the movement and expand participation. In many
cases, multiple tensions and propensities fueling the insurgency overlap and
intertwine with one another, weaving a complex web that confuses and
deceives both academic and military attempts to determine appropriate
approaches to defusing the cause of the insurgency.
It is possible for an insurgency to develop from a single cause, for the
insurgents to identify and communicate this unifying cause to the population,
and for the insurgents to remain steadfastly focused even as counterinsurgents
undermine their organization and redress the cause. But often the case that there
is no single cause, that popular support is mobilized by appealing to multiple
motivations, and that by the time counterinsurgents resolve the initial grievance,
the insurgency has found alternative justifications to mobilize popular support.
Since insurgent leadership is often competent and adaptive, it would be wise to
consider the latter scenario against any counterinsurgency strategy. Yet, even
when this is acknowledged in the counterinsurgency literature, the theory is
remarkably silent how this affects the choice of operational approach. We must
venture outside of the standard counterinsurgency (COIN) literature to address
this gap.
The structure of this article is as follows. The next section briefly reviews the
way classic COIN theories deal with underlying tensions and the insurgent
1

Galula, David, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger,
1964); Record, Jeffrey, Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win (Dulles, VA: Potomac
Books, 2007); Ktison, Frank, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and
Peacekeeping (Saint Petersburg, FL: Hailer, 1973); O'Neill, Bard, Insurgency and
Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books,
2005); James, Anthony, Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of
Counterinsurgency (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2004).
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cause. This is followed by two case studies in the Philippines and Indonesia,
which illustrate how propensities and tensions within a society give rise to
and sustain the insurgents’ cause. Next, the authors introduce a framework
for considering insurgencies with more than one potential cause. This
presents a number of practical implications for COIN strategy, which are
developed in the last section.

The Cause in Counterinsurgency Theory
Roger Trinquier’s early recognition of the link between underlying tensions in
society and insurgent movement formation is a good place to begin this
discussion. Trinquier notes:
“Warfare is now and interlocking system of actions—political,
economic, psychological, military—that aims at the overthrow of the
established authority in a country and its replacement by another
regime. To achieve this end, the aggressor tries to exploit the
international tensions of the country attacked—ideological, social,
religious, economic—any conflict liable to have a profound influence
on the population to be conquered [italics in original].”2
Trinquier identifies four broad categories of tension in the above quote:
ideological, social, religious and economic, which seem to encompass most of
the specific complaints that could emanate from a group in society and be
used by an exploitative insurgent or group of insurgents to develop a cause
which can be used to rally support around. Trinquier also emphasizes that
the tensions that can turn into the foundation of an insurgent cause seemed
limitless even in 1964. He observes that, “from a localized conflict of
secondary origin and importance, they will always attempt sooner or later to
bring about a generalized conflict.”3
It is ironic that while Trinquier observes underlying tensions as being
fundamental to the cause and insurgency formation and sustainment, he
spends the rest of his book explaining how population and resource control
through accurate censuses, intelligence, and restricting and monitoring
movement, is the key to victory. His original observations regarding tensions
seems lost and it is almost as if he has taken for granted that once an
insurgency begins, it must be dealt with using almost the same COIN methods

2

Trinquier, Roger, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (Fort
Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1964): 20, 22.
3
Ibid, 6.
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that the insurgent is employing: clamping down on the population instead of
addressing those issues that are fueling the movement.
Galula places more emphasis on the necessity of the cause and notes that,
“problems of all natures are exploitable for an insurgency.”4 But he does not
discuss these problems in terms of tensions or even local grievances, instead
focusing on what makes a good and sustainable cause. While Trinquier
explains the role of tensions in cause formation well, Galula does a far better
job of providing avenues for attacking the underlying tensions and thus
undermining the insurgent’s cause. Galula argues that even after the
insurgency has initiated armed violence, a good COIN strategy would be to
research insurgent demands and comprise a list that the counterinsurgent
will immediately use to identify easily addressed complaints. If successful,
the entire insurgency can be undermined by addressing some of the core
complaints or tensions that the insurgent had previously used to develop the
insurgent cause.5

Propensities and Tensions Feeding Insurgent Causes
Appreciating the historical and cultural context is particularly important to
understanding the dynamics of insurgencies. The history and culture of a
nation-state, identity group, or region is an important source of underlying
tensions. The collective memories of actors, kept alive through narrative
accounts of histories often extending back hundreds or thousands of years,
are relevant because they guide and constrain future actions.
The present study refers to the influence of past events, ideas, and emotions
on future events as the propensity of a situation. This is not a deterministic
relationship between past and future states, but rather a conditioning of
future possibilities on the past. For example, a history of exploitative
engagements with Western nation-states and past colonizers could place a
counterinsurgent in the unenviable position of actually having to “fight”
history, or at least historical perception, just to be accepted as a legitimate
actor by the local population. This society may have a propensity for
xenophobia and defiance against external intervention.
There are multiple insurgent groups that have operated or are currently
operating in the Philippines, including Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF), and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
4
5

Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 22.
Ibid, 103.
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(MILF). These groups have exhibited very little operational synergy. In fact,
ASG and MILF are splinter groups from MNLF. However, they and their
civilian supporters share one key propensity. They view the national
government and any foreign military intervener on behalf of the national
government as nothing more than an extension of unfair and brutal
repression of Muslims, which began with Spanish colonization.

Case of the Philippines
Islam was introduced to the Philippines in the thirteenth century. Originally,
it was isolated to the Sulu islands but eventually spread to encompass not
only the Sulu islands but, almost all of the southern island of Mindanao.
Spanish conquistadors arrived shortly after the spread of Islam in 1565 and a
brutal colonization effort was waged for three hundred and thirty four years.6
Eventually, the Spanish relinquished control of the Philippines to the United
States in 1898, but this almost immediately resulted in hostilities between the
United States and the Philippines and ultimately resulted in the AmericanPhilippine War (1899-1902). The bloody war that ensued produced over
seven thousand U.S. casualties and a far greater magnitude on the Filipino
side. The war cost the United States $400 million to prosecute.7 The goal of
the United States was to ultimately produce a self-governing Philippines.8
Even though the Philippine Independence Act of 1934 was crafted
guaranteeing a free and sovereign state, the damage done during the war—
coupled with the Spanish colonial experience—created a deep-seated mistrust
of foreign military intervention, especially among Muslims in the south.9
The animosity from this historical legacy and the resulting distrust of
outsiders is just one of many aspects that must be taken into account when
intervening in the Muslim-dominated regions of the Philippines. Considering
this obstacle, the successful trajectory of the U. S. Special Forces continuing
Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) operation is
particularly noteworthy. The use of the indirect approach by U. S. Special
Forces manifested in operating by, with, and through the Filipino military
may have allowed the U. S. Special Forces to mitigate the negative propensity
described above.
6

Thomas G. Wilson, Jr., “Extending the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao to the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front: A Catalyst for Peace,” (MMAS Monograph: U.S. Army
School of Advanced Military Studies, 2009), 13-14.
7
Birtle, Andrew J., U. S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations
Doctrine 1860-1941 (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Army Center of Military History, 2004),
108.
8
Ibid, 119.
9
Also known as the Tydings-Mcduffie Act.
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Unfortunately, propensities are not the only critical part of the operating
environment that a counterinsurgent has to indentify and contend with.
Underlying tensions are also an important aspect feeding into the insurgent
cause. Tensions exist whenever two or more opposing forces coincide. For
the case of insurgency, we are particularly interested in tensions arising from
value conflict, whether this is within or between actors. Because these
tensions can be layered, this creates a problem of transparency. This, in turn,
may create a causal link problem whereby the counterinsurgent addresses the
most recent tension being exploited by the insurgent without addressing root
tensions or causes, which initially or more fundamentally fed the insurgent
cause. Conversely, new tensions may have replaced old ones, creating a
situation whereby the counterinsurgent is wasting time and resources
addressing the original tension(s) that were formative to the movement but
no longer active.

Case of Indonesia
The Banda Aceh region of Indonesia located on the northern tip of the island
of Sumatra provides an example of layered tensions that can fuel an
insurgency. Indonesia is a patchwork of disparate peoples, many of whom
have only the historical experience of repressive Dutch colonialism in
common. Both Sukarno’s and Suharto’s dictatorial rule, while admittedly
very brutal, helped to forge a national identity for Indonesia. But even this
was fragile, and poor economic and human rights treatment of the people of
East Timor eventually led to the small southern island breaking away from
the Indonesian nation-state. Further, both the Papuans of West Papua and
the Acehnese of northern Sumatra have expressed their desire for
independence.
The layering of tensions fueling the rebellion against the Indonesian
government is most evident in the Acehnese case so it will be briefly described
here. The people of the province of Aceh have suffered a great deal from the
founding of the nation through the rule of President Megawatti. Under the
rule of President Suharto, Indonesia was witness to a great deal of persecution
of out-groups. Developing his dictatorial vision of the “New Order,” Suharto
enforced authoritarian rule to pursue economic development. He initially
targeted communists, culminating with the outlawing of all communist

47
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parties.10 After dealing with the communists, Suharto turned his attentions to
Muslim political activists, persecuting key leaders and movements.11
Understandably, a resistance movement formed known as the Free Aceh
Movement, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), which soon drew violent
crackdowns from the Indonesian government. This movement has been
labeled as a terrorist organization by the central government but there is little
proof that GAM ever perpetrated an attack against civilian targets. The
present authors feel GAM would be better labeled an insurgent or secessionist
movement although most of the actions taken by members of GAM fell under
the domain of peaceful protest. Despite these facts, GAM was a threat to
Indonesian control of the province of Aceh and several notable violent clashes
did occur between members of GAM and the Indonesian military.
The tsunami of 2005, which killed over 160,000 people, changed the
landscape and created an opportunity for the Indonesian government and
America to step in and provide emergency aid and longer-term aid to rebuild
the catastrophe ravaged province. Susilo Yudhayono had only recently
replaced Megawatti as President but he decided to extend a hand to the
people of Aceh offering profit sharing from the massive natural gas reserves
off the coast of Aceh as well as greater participation in Indonesian politics.12
Stability soon returned to the region and GAM entered a period of inactivity.
This would have been the end of the story except that a new background
tension had already developed fueled by the same government mistreatment
that the people of Aceh had suffered at the hands of the national government.
The propensity to distrust central government rule engendered through an
unbroken succession of Presidents willing to use heavy-handed military
tactics against the Acehnese from Sukarno to Megawatti is now being
enmeshed with a tension, engendered by regional terror group Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI), between religious fundamentalism and secularism. Therefore,
despite massive aid to the province following the tsunami of 2005 and despite
recent political and local rule concessions granted by the Indonesian
government to the Aceh province, a strong fundamental Islamic movement is
10

Ulf Sundhaussen, “Indonesia: Past and Present Encounters with Democracy,” in Larry
Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.), Democracy in Developing
Nations: Asia 3 (1989), 440.
11
William R. Liddle, “The Islamic Turn in Indonesia,” The Journal of Asian Studies 55:3
(1996): 614.
12
Michael Vatikiotis, “Southeast Asia in 2005: Strength in the Face of Adversity,” in Dajit
Singh and Lorraine Carlos Salazar (eds.) Southeast Asian Affairs (Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), 6.
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forming. It should be noted this is a novel development in Indonesian
history.13 In 2003, Aceh’s first sharia court opened. It was initially promised
by local religious leaders that implementation of sharia law would be
“moderate” and that human rights would not be abused. However,
punishment for failing to attend Friday prayer, for example, could be public
caning.14 Any pretentions at moderation are quickly passing. In Fall 2009,
new laws passed which stated “married people convicted of adultery can be
sentenced to death by stoning. Unmarried people can be sentenced to 100
lashes with a cane.”15
Similarly, a specialized police unit, Wilayatul Hisbah, is now patrolling the
streets of Aceh looking to disrupt or arrest “unmarried couples, Muslim
women without headscarves or those wearing tight clothes, and people
drinking alcohol or gambling,” which is apparently aimed at combating
Western influence, especially influence that seeped into the region when
Western nations provided post-tsunami aid.16 Even though some Acehnese
citizens have expressed discontent with the increasingly harsh religious laws,
most are afraid to voice their concerns for fear of being branded unreligious.17
Overlaying this fundamentalist trend is increasing violence surrounding
elections in the province and an increasingly active and violent JI. While a
period of quiescence has ensued after the 2005 peace agreement, if violence
aimed at the Indonesian national government ensues again, a new tension—
religious fundamentalism vs political secularism firmly layered over old
economic grievances and a history of poor human rights treatment—will
create an even more complex insurgency to deal with than was ever presented
by GAM.
In summary, even if one could identify “the cause” for an insurgency, it must
still emerge from a complex web of dynamic tensions and propensities. As
the underlying tensions evolve, so too can the cause. Consequently, a singular,
13

Vatikiotis, Michael, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of the New
Order 3rd ed., (New York: Routledge, 1993), 119.
14
“Aceh’s Sharia Court,” BBC News Online, March 4, 2003, available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/em/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/2816785.stm.
15
“Aceh Passes Adultery Stoning Law,” BBC News Online, September 14, 2009, available
at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/em/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/8254631.stm.
16
“Islamic Police Tighten Grip on Indonesia’s Aceh,” The Malaysian Insider, January 14,
2010, available at: http://themalaysianinsider.com/index.php/world/49530-islamicpolice-tighten-grip-on-indonesias-aceh.
17
Katie Hamann, “Aceh’s Sharia Law Still Controversial in Indonesia,” VOA News,
December 29, 2009, available at:
http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/religion/Acehs-Sharia-Law-StillControversial-in-Indonesia-80257482.html.
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static definition of the insurgent cause is not a reliable foundation for
planning COIN operations. While this is already largely recognized in COIN
doctrine and theory, the logical implications for COIN strategy have not been
fully resolved. A multi-causal account of insurgency requires new conceptual
tools not available within traditional COIN theory.

A Conceptual Framework for Multi-causal Insurgency
This section develops a multi-casual framework for understanding
insurgency. First, a distinction is necessary between causation and insurgent
causes. Causation is the inference of relationships of necessity and sufficiency
between a cause and its effects. Research into the causes of war seeks to
uncover this kind of causal relationship. In the previous discussion, the
complex web of dynamic tensions and propensities links causes and effects.
In contrast, according to U.S. Field Manual (FM) 3-24, “A cause is a principle
or movement militantly defended or supported.”18 Galula explains how a
cause is linked with underlying tensions:
“What is a political problem? It is ‘an unsolved contradiction’,
according to Mao Tse-tung. If one accepts this definition, then a
political cause is the championing of one side of the contradiction.”19
Insurgent causes are not material causes that produce causal effects; rather
insurgent causes provide justification for resorting to violent action.
Although the two concepts are related, they are quite distinct and should not
be conflated. Causation is generally relevant to the level of tactical action,
whereas insurgent causes influence the insurgency at the strategic level. Both
causation and insurgent causes will be relevant to our discussion below.
Until recently, most scientific explanations of causation focused on single
cause-effect relationships. For example, the Guide for Understanding and
Implementing Defense Experimentation: GUIDEx, a report produced in
collaboration between defense scientists representing Australia, Canada, the
United Kingdom, and the United States, asserts:
“Any national or coalition capability problem may be stated as: Does A
cause B? An experimental capability or concept—a new way of doing
business—is examined in experimentation to determine if the
18

U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency (Washington,
D.C.: HQDA, December 15, 2006), 1-10.
19
Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 10.
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proposed capability A causes the anticipated military effect B. The
experiment hypothesis states the causal relationship between the
proposed solution and the problem.”20
This accurately expresses the classical scientific view of experimentation. The
GUIDEx goes on to say that an important criteria of a good experiment is the
ability to isolate the reason for change in the effect B.21 In this paradigm, the
goal of experimentation is to answer the question of causation between one
independent variable and one dependent variable. The method of
experimentation is to create a closed system to eliminate alternative sources
of variation that could confound the experimental result. In this paradigm,
accumulated knowledge from multiple experiments permits reasoning about
causal chains: A causes B, which causes C, which causes D.
Although scientists may occasionally approximate the ideal conditions of a
closed system for long enough to isolate a single independent variable, this
degree of control is of course impossible in any human society. The societies
in which insurgencies foment are open systems, characterized by perpetual
novelty and an uncountable number of independent variables. Here,
causality is networked, and cannot be reduced to single cause-effect
relationships, or even to linear causal chains.
Complex systems science provides an alternative perspective capable of
making sense of networked causality. Distributed networks of autonomous
agents that make local decisions based on local information characterize
complex adaptive systems. From these individual local choices, global
patterns emerge and feed back to affect the subsequent decisions of the
autonomous agents. As a result of these iterative feedback cycles, causation is
complex, networked, and circular. Perturbation of A may ripple out to affect
B, C, and D, which in turn affects A. Thus, not only do causes have effects but,
those effects may actually have caused the cause!
If this all sounds unnecessarily convoluted, it is worthwhile considering the
very real effects these feedback loops can generate. A classic example is the
self-fulfilling prophecy of a bank run. A rumor that a bank is in financial
difficulty—even when it is not—may cause cautious investors to withdraw

20

The Technical Cooperation Program, Guide for Understanding and Implementing
Defense Experimentation (Ottawa, Canada: Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre,
February 2006), available at:
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ttcp/reference/docs/GUIDExBookFeb2006.pdf.
21
Ibid, 13.
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their money. Seeing long queues of customers withdrawing their savings
causes more customers to withdraw their savings, and the problem snowballs.
Before the end of the day, the bank has exhausted its liquid reserves, and
actually is insolvent. Perceptions and rumors can have similar and no less
dramatic effects during revolutions and counter insurgencies. Galula cites the
effective use of the slogan “Land to the Tiller” by the Chinese Communists to
promote the false idea that land ownership in China was concentrated in the
hands of a small minority.22

Complex Systems and Intervention Options
Complex systems exhibit self-organization, emergence, hysteresis, latent
pathways, and adaptation. Understanding each of these concepts provides
important insights for COIN theory, and opens up new intervention options
for counterinsurgents.

Self-organization
Self-organization is the spontaneous increase in order over time in an open
system. It is spontaneous in the sense that it is not externally imposed, but
accrues through interactions between parts of the system as energy flows
through it. A widely studied model of self-organization demonstrates a
spontaneous increase in organization when agents set their color by following
two rules. The first rule, short-range activation, sets the color preference to
the most common color of the agent’s closest neighbors. The second rule,
long-range inhibition, sets the color preference to be opposite of the most
common color of the agent’s more distant neighbors. Other parameters of the
model include the radius for the nearest neighbors, the radius for the distant
neighbors, and the weighting given to short range activation versus longrange inhibition. The outcome of this model is shown in Figure 1. Within five
time steps, an initially random mix of black and white agents has selforganized into a pattern of black and white stripes. With different initial
conditions, the model will produce black and white stripes different in detail,
but with the same qualitative pattern. With different parameter settings, the
same rule set can produce uniformly black or white agents, black spots on a
white background, or vice versa. This very simple model has been used to
explain growth and differentiation of the structure of an organism, pattern
formation in animal fur, and the clustering of industries in regional
economics.23
22

Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 17.
Alan M. Turing, "The Chemical Basis of Morphogenesis, Philosophical Transactions of
the Royal Society of London," Series B, Biological Sciences 237:641 (1952), 37-72;

23
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Figure 1: Pattern Formation as an Example of Self-Organization
and Emergence
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In the COIN literature, it is common to divide the population into three
states: Actively supporting the Government, the neutral majority, and
actively supporting the insurgency. Accepting this simplification for the
present discussion, the dynamics of self-organization help to explain why one
village can be pro-Government, while a nearby village with identical social
conditions supports the insurgency. Because an actor’s choice of state is
conditioned by the states of others in the actor’s social network, a population
that is compelled to choose between insurgents and counterinsurgents will
tend to cluster into spatially organized patterns over time.
The first implication of self-organization is that the spatial distribution of proGovernment and pro-insurgent populations is more important than the total
proportion of the population in each state. Measures of effectiveness that
aggregate national statistical data can be misleading. A color-coded map that
shows patterns of allegiance over time provides a much richer assessment
tool. In COIN, the local situation can be very different from the neighboring
local situation and from the regional situation. Therefore, decision-makers at
lower levels need greater autonomy to tailor plans to their local context. Of
course, the importance of bottom-up intelligence flows and devolving
decisions to the lowest levels are already standard tenets of COIN doctrine.24
The jointly published U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps doctrine
Counterinsurgency describes COIN as “a shifting ‘mosaic war’ that is difficult
for counterinsurgents to envision as a coherent whole.”25 What is new here is
that self-organization provides a theoretical explanation for the “mosaic war”
Nagorcka BN and JR Mooney, "From stripes to spots: prepatterns which can be produced
in the skin by a reaction-diffusion system," IMA Journal of Mathematics Applied in
Medicine and Biology 9:4 (1992): 249-67; Paul Krugman, "A Dynamic Spatial Model,"
National Bureau Of Economic Research Working Paper No. 4219 (Cambridge, MA:
National Bureau of Economic Research, November 1992).
24
Department of the Army, Field Manaul 3-24, 1-26 and 3-31.
25
Ibid,1-8.
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observed in practice, a justification for decentralized execution of COIN
operations, and a prescription for assessment of progress.
The second implication of self-organization is that indirect approaches lead to
more radical transformations in the observed pattern than direct
intervention. The patterns formed are attractors in a dynamical system, and
tend to be robust to local perturbation. For the majority of agents in Figure 1,
changing their color from black to white has no permanent effect on the
system. The unchanged state of their neighbors simply means the agent will
flip back in the next time step. Direct action will only work if a critical
number of agents are simultaneously flipped. Even then, as long as the
underlying calculus of the agents remains unchanged, direct action will likely
only redistribute the location of black and white stripes, and have no longterm effect on their relative proportion. In contrast, a relatively small shift in
the weighting between the short-range activation and long-range inhibition
rules can qualitatively change the observed patterns. The change sweeps
through the system using exactly the same self-organizing dynamics that
perpetuated the original pattern. In COIN, this means that in general, taking
indirect action to alter the calculus of the population in choosing whether to
support the insurgents or the Government is likely to be more effective for
transformation than coercion through population control measures.

Emergence
The patterns produced by self-organizing systems are emergent. Emergence
means the whole is different from the sum of its parts.26 In science, there is
an emergence hierarchy between physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology.
The laws of chemistry are constrained by, but additional to, the laws of
physics. Biology is constrained by the laws of chemistry, and chemicals are
the building blocks of cells, but chemistry also introduces new theories to
explain life. Psychology is constrained by biology, but again new theories
operate at the level of mind. At each level, theory is constrained by lower
levels, but it also has some autonomy from the level below. New concepts and
new rules are needed to explain regularities at the higher level. In Figure 1,
one can meaningfully talk about stripes and spots in relation to the whole.
Yet, at the level of individual agents, the rule set operates only on local
information about the color of close and distant neighbors. Stripes and spots
are emergent properties that are meaningless at the individual level. Patterns
that emerge from one level provide the building blocks for systems at the next
level up.
26

P.W. Anderson, "More is Different," Science 177:4047 (August 4, 1972): 393-396.
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In the same way, there is an emergence hierarchy in counterinsurgency
warfare. The operational level of warfare is not simply the aggregation of
tactical engagements. The strategic level that connects the military
instrument with policy is qualitatively different than the operational level,
which plans and executes the campaign within the theatre of operations.
Different concepts are required for different levels of war. For example,
Stathis Kalyvas finds in his detailed study of violence in civil war, especially in
the Greek Civil War, that people, far from being unified to act violently
because of fear, ideology, or prewar political social polarization, acted
violently selectively for very sub-regional, even local reasons.27 Kalyvas is not
arguing that all violence is local for political and insurgent leaders can
certainly move people and groups to violence. Instead, he is attempting to
differentiate between the macro and micro motives that move people to
violence in all conflicts. As Kalyvas argues,
“indiscriminate violence is an informational shortcut that may backfire
on those who use it; selective violence is jointly produced by political
actors seeking information and individuals trying to avoid the worst—
but also grabbing what opportunities the predicament affords them.”28
Kalyvas notes that civil wars are distinct from interstate wars mainly through
the level of intimacy each exhibits. Interstate wars are affairs between
strangers and thus lack intimacy but civil wars, and we would argue
insurgencies as well, are wars against countrymen, neighbors, and even
relatives.29 Neighbors, relatives, and friends would regularly denounce each
other to legitimate and illegitimate authorities for myriad reasons including
jealousy and personnel grievance. It was a short step from denunciation to
violence, for neighbors, relatives, and friends, if the opportunity afforded it.30
Some people were genuinely moved by their leaders’ political motives but
many others are found in civil war and insurgency to be motivated by petty
and extremely personal agendas.
The implication of Kalyvas’ study and our current work is that it is misguided
to establish an operational campaign aimed at the cause or the center of
gravity. As Kalyvas notes, many scholars and practitioners find the cause of
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violence to be impenetrable so they hand-wave “explanations for violence
emphasizing collective emotions, ideologies, and cultures that have low
explanatory power.”31 Therefore, the best campaign plan might be to allow
brigade and battalion commanders a great deal of latitude in dealing with the
local motives for violence in a counterinsurgency since motives might be
macro, micro, or a mix of the two.

Hysteresis
The third concept from complex systems science, hysteresis, is a non-linear
behavior encountered in a wide variety of processes ranging from
ferroelectricity to biology, where the input-output dynamic relations between
variables involve memory effects.32 Hysteresis implies path dependence.
When a system returns to a previous state, it may behave differently.
Moreover, different paths to the same state can result in different behavior.
Consequently, in systems with hysteresis, it is insufficient to only know the
current state. The history of the system is essential for making sense of future
possible patterns of behavior.
Path dependence and the importance of history are hardly new to the
counterinsurgent. The significance of hysteresis is in targeting insurgent
causes. Once a Government loses legitimacy, addressing stated grievances
would not automatically win back popular support. For example, in Egypt,
President Mubarak’s concession in response to mass protests may have
actually emboldened the protesters to raise additional demands and led to
wider support. A more sophisticated approach is required to counter
insurgent causes.
Instead of reacting to the insurgent causes directly, counterinsurgents need to
understand how causes relate to dominant narratives within a society.
Narratives are not simply a disinterested chronology of events. The choice of
perspective from which the story is told, which actors are given a voice and
which are ignored, which events are emphasized and which are omitted, as
well as the bounding of the narrative in time and geography all affect the
implied moral of the story. The sequencing of events, feelings, and actions
can be used to suggest relationships between effects and their causes.
Insurgent causes that can be connected with existing narratives are more

31

Ibid, 388.
Ikhouane, Fayçal and José Rodellar, Systems with hysteresis: analysis, identification
and control using the Bouc-Wen model (Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Interscience,
2007), xi.

32

56
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol8/iss1/4
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.8.1.1419

Cox and Ryan: Countering Insurgency

likely to achieve resonance within a society, which can greatly expand the
base of support.
Once insurgent causes become associated with a narrative, directly countering
the narrative may inadvertently strengthen it. George Lakoff uses a simple
example to illustrate this point. The effect of the instruction “Don’t think of
an elephant!” is invariably the opposite of its intent. Elinor Ochs and Lisa
Capps make the point that
“counternarratives do not necessarily involve overt reference to a
prevailing narrative world view. It is the voicing of a disjunctive reality
itself that constitutes the counterpoint. Indeed, the posing of an
alternative account may be more effective in dismantling the status
quo perspective than overt critiques. In making reference to them,
critiques perpetuate the salience of the dominant discourses they
otherwise aim to uproot.”33
Effectively countering insurgent causes requires the fostering of new
identities and a narrative that voices a “disjunctive reality.” A good example of
this is the change in usage of “United States” prior to the American Civil War
as a plural noun, to a singular noun afterwards, representing a transformation
from “Union” to nation.
Lincoln’s wartime speeches betokened this transition. In his first inaugural
address, he used the word “Union” twenty times and the word “nation” not
once... In his letter to Horace Greeley of August 22, 1862, on the relationship
of slavery to the war, Lincoln spoke of the Union eight times and of the nation
not at all. Little more than a year later, in his address at Gettysburg, the
president did not refer to the “Union” at all but used the word “nation” five
times to invoke a new birth of freedom and nationalism for the United States.
And in his second inaugural address, looking back over the events of the past
four years, Lincoln spoke of one side seeking to dissolve the Union in 1861
and the other accepting the challenge of war to preserve the nation.34
Lincoln used language to help forge new identities and shape narratives as
America emerged from civil war. A narrative emphasizing nationalism
reframed political discourse away from the divisive Union and Confederate
terminology.
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Latent pathways
Complex systems are highly networked. This gives rise to the fourth concept
from complex systems science: energy, matter, and information flows along
multiple pathways. Observing the current pattern of behavior only provides
information about active pathways; latent pathways may not be visible.
Consequently, complex systems generally exhibit graceful degradation. When
one pathway is blocked, latent pathways are activated to preserve system
functionality. The so-called balloon effect is a good example of multiple
pathways in a complex system. To counter the Medellin cartel’s drug
smuggling operations between Columbia and the United States, the South
Florida Drug Task Force conducted a successful operation that dramatically
reduced the volume of drugs entering Florida via the Caribbean. However,
this did not stop the flow of drugs into the United States. In response,
Columbian cartels established relationships with Mexican marijuana cartels
to smuggle narcotics across the 2000 mile shared border with the United
States. The current violence of the Mexican drug war is an indirect result of
successfully closing down one pathway within a complex system.
The concept of multiple pathways is related to insurgent causes. One should
expect that effectively addressing one cause would activate new pathways for
mobilizing the insurgency. This reinforces the dangers of focusing on a single
insurgent cause. Even though latent pathways in a complex system may not
be obvious from observing the current pattern of behavior, it is possible to
anticipate alternative pathways before they are activated. This is where an
understanding of the underlying tensions and propensity within the society is
critical, because it illuminates contradictions that the insurgents may seek to
exploit. Identifying potential out-groups, such as the Shiite population in
Bahrain, also allows the counterinsurgent to anticipate the kind of grievances
insurgents may use to mobilize these out-groups, and then take steps to
mitigate these latent pathways before they are activated.

Adaptation
The final complex systems concept considered here is adaptation. COIN
theorists often remark upon the adaptive nature of insurgents. FM 3-24
claims that competent insurgents are adaptive.35 Yet, paradoxically, it is the
relative weakness of insurgent forces that provides them an edge in
adaptability. Complex systems scientists have drawn on Charles Darwin’s
theory of evolution to show why insurgents adapt faster and more
35
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effectively.36 Adaptation requires the presence of variation, selection, and
replication. In an asymmetric conflict, the weaker side usually contains more
diversity, are subject to a stronger selection pressure than the pressure they
exert on the strong side, and are exposed to combat for longer, which
replicates combat experience.37 This theory is supported quantitatively with
data from both Iraq and Afghanistan, which shows that the average time
interval between fatal improvised explosive devise attacks increases
logarithmically over the duration of the war.38 To paraphrase Megginson’s
paraphrasing of Darwin, it is not the strongest insurgencies that survive, nor
the most intelligent, but rather the most adaptable to change.
Given the central importance of adaptation in COIN, counterinsurgents need
to both improve their own adaptability and counter the adaptability of the
insurgent. This requires increased variation in our own forces, stronger
selection pressure, and faster replication of successful innovations. Counteradaptation requires weakening or distorting the evolutionary pressure applied
to insurgents. Lieutenant Colonel Michael Ryan, Australian Army,
deliberately used counter-adaptation against the Taliban as the commander
of the 1st Reconstruction Task Force in Oruzgan Province, Afghanistan.
Recent advances in evolutionary theory provide new insights into how to
leverage the power of adaptation. The evolution of evolvability—second order
adaptation—applies evolution to the process of evolution itself. For example,
the way that variation is generated is far from random, because it has adapted
to produce genotypic variation in areas that are correlated with the greatest
environmental flux, while error-correcting codes protect regions associated
with critical functionality from too much variation. Second order adaptation
enables counterinsurgents to accelerate their rate of adaptation. As a simple
example, the use of after-action reviews (AAR) helps units to learn and adapt.
Adapting how AARs are conducted to improve their effectiveness is a secondorder adaptation.
Evolutionary biologists are now also accepting that selective pressure applies
not just at the level of the gene, but also to organisms and even groups of
organisms. While selection pressures at the lowest level of selection are the
36
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most rapid and strongest in magnitude, the subtle effects of group selection
may actually dominate over longer time scales. A multilevel view of selection
points to a potential key advantage for counterinsurgents. Even if insurgents
have an advantage in tactical adaptation because of their highly variable and
decentralized structure, counterinsurgents can still be more adaptive at the
operational and strategic levels, because they are better integrated. The
slower, but more strategic adaptations of the counterinsurgent may steer
insurgents into a corner where faster tactical adaptation becomes largely
irrelevant. However, this requires counterinsurgents to deliberately work to
improve their higher-level adaptive mechanisms.

Conclusion: Implications for COIN Approaches
Given what has been argued thus far, a premium is placed on developing
historical and cultural intelligence on the leader and member mindset. What
has propelled these individuals to transmutate from peaceful political
grievance to violent rebellion? This is just one example of a cogent question
that must be answered before the cause can be fully understood and dealt
with. Such cultural and historical intelligence necessitates that deep
knowledge be developed on the insurgent identity group(s) but that is a
positive development as it narrows the scope of study when addressing the
insurgent cause. For example, in terms of operations and tactics, it is
certainly important to know that Iraqi citizens harbor a deep distaste for dogs.
However, this information is of little use in developing a plan to combat the
insurgent cause, excepting, of course, that employment of culturally
insensitive tactics only adds fuel to the insurgent cause.
What needs to be discerned are the historical, political, and cultural
antecedents to insurgency. One needs to understand the historical
propensities the will have to be considered when developing a campaign to
combat the insurgency. But one also needs to know the individual tensions in
society, like discrimination against certain minorities, historical economic
exploitation of a region, religious discrimination, etc. that are not only
currently being used by the insurgents to develop their cause and broaden
their appeal, but also tensions that could be exploited in the future either to
expand the insurgency or can be shifted to if the counterinsurgent is
successful in combating one or more of the original tensions that fueled the
insurgent cause.
The counterinsurgent would take all of this into consideration developing a
more sophisticated Galulesque list of not only insurgent demands but,
underlying tensions and propensities which are feeding these demands.
60
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol8/iss1/4
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.8.1.1419

Cox and Ryan: Countering Insurgency

Galula suggests immediately addressing the demands that the legitimate
national government can and ignoring the rest.39 The present authors do not
suggest this course of action. Before meeting even a single demand or
addressing a single underlying tension in society one must attempt to think
through how injecting energy into the system will affect the overall system.
For example, does dealing with the underlying poverty in a society push the
insurgent to a more religious tension from which to fuel the insurgency? Are
there tensions the other tensions the insurgents are not using which could be
co-opted after poverty is addressed? When one views just the cause through
the lens of complexity, it becomes clear that engaging in counterinsurgency is
a very messy endeavor.
Also, it should become clear from this analysis that COIN operations will have
to be very fluid and undergo a process of constant revision as one notes
changes in the environmental frame. Such an approach should also help one
to successfully categorize what type of insurgency is being presented. Bard
O’Neill makes a valiant attempt at disaggregating types of insurgency noting
that each type demands a different COIN approaches to address it.40 This
implies that certain strategies might work with some insurgencies while they
inadvertently fuel others making identification of the tensions and cause even
more important.
The current situation in Pakistan serves as an illustrative example. The
Pakistani government has always had great trouble penetrating and
controlling the Baluchistani area and Northwest Frontier Porvince (NWFP).
This problem has become particularly acute in the post-Musharef era and the
Pakistani Taliban have experienced success exploiting this historical lack of
control coupled with the chaos created by the fall of Musharef. The
government initially attempted to offer conciliations to the Pakistani Taliban
such as more local autonomy and stricter religious standards in schooling and
local law enforcement. But this approach soon backfired as the Taliban rather
than entering into a period of calm inactivity actually became emboldened
and challenged the rule of the national government more forcefully. A messy
and violent counterinsurgency campaign ensued and the outcome regarding
whom will eventually rule Pakistan is still in doubt.
Noting all of the above, conciliations given to insurgents has been successfully
employed as a counterinsurgent strategy in past insurgencies, but according
to the 2010 RAND study How Insurgencies End this is rare, occurring in less
39
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than a third of modern insurgencies. Notable twentieth century examples
include El Salvador, Guatemala, South Africa, and Northern Ireland.41 The
key is in understanding the system, propensities, and tensions that feed and
frame the cause before attacking the cause.
In the final analysis, if one takes Kalyvas’s thesis that all violence is local at
face value, and one recognizes the complexity of social interactions, then one
must also admit that causes will be highly personalized. One person might
join the insurgency out of a real hatred for the central government. Another
might join for social reasons. Still others might be drawn for religious reasons
or even by the allure of potential criminality. Not only will different people
and different groups join for different reasons but the main cause will likely
shift over time.
This article is aimed at beginning the conversation and shifting the mindset of
counterinsurgency researchers. Without a more sophisticated approach
toward understanding the causes of insurgency, countering them will be
impossible.
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